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VOLUME XXVI JUNE, 1942 NUMBER FOUR
PROBLEMS OF MODERN JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY LEGISLATION
J. WAJ TER MCKENNA* and PILip W. GROSSMAN, JR.t
N spite of a revolutionary development during the past fifty years
in the treatment of minors who have violated the criminal law,
existing legislation is continuously undergoing adjustments. After
noting historical instances which led the way from early common law
methods of treating the child offender in the same manner as an adult
criminal, it will be the purpose of this note to review the problems of
modem juvenile delinquency legislation.
Cases of the early 18th century clearly indicate the effect of English
common law rulings.1 A nine year old child was found guilty of mur-
der and was hanged.2 A thirteen year old girl was burned to death for
the crime of murder.3 An eight year old boy was executed for commit-
*Professor of law, Marquette University; member of the New York and
Wisconsin bars.
t Senior in the Marquette University Law School.
I B'ARou, CRiMiNAL LAW (2d ed. 1852) 262.
2 1 Hales P. C. 27; 1 Russ on Cr. 3; (Noted, mtpra note 1, p. 263).
3 1 Hales P. C. 26; (Noted, supra note 1, p. 262).
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ting arson.4 At common law, England and the United States regard
the ages at which a child may be held responsible for criminal acts to
be divided into three distinct periods. An infant under the age of
seven years is presumed, conclusively, to have no capacity to commit a
crime. There is a presumption of incapacity to form criminal intent
between the ages of seven and fourfeen years, but this is rebuttable.
After fourteen years the child is presumed capable of committing a
crime, but such presumption is subject to proof as to the real fact.5
Thus, only two things are required at common law for the conviction
of a minor over seven years of age: 1) that the illegal act was com-
mitted in fact, and 2) that the child was capable of intending to do
wrong and understood the wrongful consequences of his act. Because
the sentences passed in the administration of the criminal law were
based on the idea of retributive justice-i.e., one must pay for his
crime with a penalty suitable to the crime-the courts began to find
themselves face to face with the necessity of making unpleasant deci-
sions. For example, in Rex v. YorkA decided in 1748, the English court
found a ten year old boy guilty of the murder of a five year old girl.
Under the facts of the case, a modern juvenile court would probably
not have recommended punishment, but psychiatric treatment. How-
ever, the court had no other authority in law but to pass the death
sentence. In reluctantly declaring that the boy must be hanged, the
opinion stated that one good reason was "it would be of very danger-
ous consequence to have it thought that children may commit such
crimes with impunity." However, a way out was found in recourse to
His Majesty's pardoning power, and this ten year old child was given
the choice of the hangman's noose or of entering His Majesty's Sea
Service for life.
Gradually the public's influence began to assert itself and execu-
tions of very young offenders began to disappear, although life im-
prisonment became the only alternative in many cases. It was during
the period in which separate reformatories for young criminals were
being established that the idea of rehabilitation rather than punish-
ment came to the foreground. Legislatures of many states in America
passed laws providing that when persons under twenty-one year of age
were convicted by criminal courts they should be placed in an institu-
tion separate from adult criminals, should learn rather than sit idle
and should be made to acquire an interest in all things tending to
destroy a lawless attitude. These reform schools have served a very
definite purpose. But the system was, in its early form, still an insti-
41 Hales P. C. 25; Arch. Crown Pl. 11; 4 Black. Com. 24; (Noted, supra note
1, p. 262).




tutionalization of the individual. Thus, when the record began to indi-
cate that persons released from these reform schools all too often
returned to a life of crime, the need for new laws was made obvious
once again. The germ of the solution was found in the laws of Massa-
chusetts in the middle 1800's. This state did most of the legal pioneer-
ing in the field of juvenile delinquency in an attempt to prevent the
courts from stamping the label "criminal" on immature offenders.
One of the early landmarks was the law which provided for a "state
agent" whose task it was to find a home for the wayward child, thus
removing the need for prison committment.7 This, of course, did not
answer the problems of all types of cases. Young boys were still being
arrested, hauled to jail with drunkards, robbers and the like, and car-
ried before the grim presence of a criminal court judge who, from his
high bench, would inform their bewildered minds what their legal
rights as criminals were. Then the court would proceed to try, convict
and sentence the worst of these offenders with the severity deemed
necessary to let them know and to let society know that society was
being protected from bad boys. From that moment to the end of
their lives they carried with them the name "criminal" wherever they
might go. If an eleven year old boy wounded a schoolmate in a school-
yard brawl, no one examined his personality to determine if he was
vicious in character or not. Where a nineteen year old was brought to
court at the height of a career of robbery, there was no one there to
ask the single question, "What made him that way ?" When a boy ran
away from home and was caught stealing food, he was convicted.
His parents were never investigated at all. Where an eighteen year old
boy took the life of his girl friend and was charged with murder,
there did not appear in court a psychiatrist with the legal power to
recommend hospitalization if this was determined the most suitable
course to follow. Because of all these shortcomings in the administra-
tion of the law, Massachusetts provided in 1870 that all cases of chil-
dren under sixteen years of age should be heard separately from
criminal cases," and that the state agent, or probation officer as we
know him today, was to investigate the case, attend the trial and pro-
tect the best interests of the child. 9 By 1891 the state probation depart-
ment was definitely established. 0 The first specialized court for juve-
nile delinquents was the Juvenile Court, or "clinic" as we call it today,
of Cook County, Illinois." The law provided for the treatment of
dependent, neglected and delinquent children alike, in a non-criminal
'Laws of Mass. (1869) ch. 453, § 4.
8 Laws of Mass. (1870) ch. 359, § 7.
9 Ibid, § 8.10 Laws of Mass. (1891) ch. 356.
"1 Laws of Ill. (1899) p. 131.
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proceeding supplemented by a probation department to suit the remedy
to the individual.
Thus, the basis upon which minors had been treated as criminals
was absolutely pushed aside; criminal responsibility or the violation
of a particular law was no longer to be an issue in an individual case.
The delinquent was put in the same category as a dependent and was
to be treated with understanding and guidance, not by punishment. 2
Similar legislation was subsequently enacted in most jurisdictions, and
by 1932 there were 633 independent juvenile courts in the United
States and 2,255 juvenile sessions of regular criminal, probate and
equity proceedings in other courts.13 It was not until as recently as
1938 that the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act was passed.14 It de-
clares that a juvenile is a person seventeen years of age or under;
juvenile delinquency is an offense against the laws of the United States
committed by a juvenile and not punishable by death or life imprison-
ment. If the Attorney General in his discretion so directs and the ac-
cused consents, the child is prosecuted on a charge of juvenile delin-
quency on information, and no prosecution is instituted for the special
offense alleged to have been committed. Such consent, made in writing
before the judge who informs the accused of the consequences of his
consent, is deemed a waiver of jury trial.
Since the Wisconsin Act is substantially similar to those of other
states, mention of its significant provisions will be helpful. It is entitled,
"Child Protection and Reformation."' 5 It provides for a Juvenile
Court, which is not a criminal court, with original jurisdiction over
all cases of neglected, dependent and delinquent children.1 6 A "delin-
quent" is defined in section 48.01(1) (c) of the Wisconsin Statutes as:
cc... any child under the age of eighteen years who has violated
any law of the state or any county, city, town or village ordi-
nance; or who by reason of being wayward or habitually diso-
bedient, is uncontrolled by his parent, guardian or custodian;
or who is habitually truant from school or home; or who habi-
tually so deports himself as to injure or endanger the morals
or health of himself or others; or, if below twenty-one years of
age, shall unlawfully and carnally know and abuse any female
under the age of eighteen years, or assault intending carnal
knowledge and abuse."
The Juvenile Court has exclusive jurisdiction over children six-
teen years of age and under. Over sixteen years the criminal courts
have concurrent jurisdiction.17 But when the Juvenile Court determines
12 S. and E. T. GLUEcK, 1000 JUVENILE DELINQUENTS (2d ed. 1934) ch. II, p. 13.
13 Ibid, p. 14.
'4 18 U.S.C.A. 921.
25 WIs. STAT. (1941) ch. 48.16 Ibid., § 48.01(2).
1I7bid., § 48.01(5) (a) 4.
[Vol. 26
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY LEGISLATION.
any child to be delinquent he shall be under its jurisdiction until he
reaches the age of twenty-one years, unless discharged prior thereto ;18
and where the criminal court has waived jurisdiction in the case of a
minor between eighteen and twenty-one years of age, the Juvenile
Court may place such minor on probation until he is twenty-five years
old, or commit him to an institution for the term to which he might
have been committed by the criminal court.19 While the statute, in
order to avoid objections on grounds of unconstitutionality, provides
for a jury trial if demanded by the minor or an interested party, 20
it was the intention of the legislature to remove all aspects of criminal
proceedings. The hearings are private ;21 usual court rules of procedure
are dispensed with, although each finding of fact must appear on the
record.2 Specially designated, though not specially qualified, judges are
to preside.23 The court has extensive powers as to the disposition of
cases, either by placing the child on probation, or under supervision
in his own home, or in the custody of some fit person, relative or other-
wise, or in a family home, or a public institution or a child welfare
agency licensed by the state; or, to quote the statute, the court may
"make such further disposition as the court may deem to be for the
best interests of the child. '2 4
The purpose of the act is further made clear by these additional
provisions: "No adjudication upon the status of any child in the juris-
diction of the juvenile court shall operate to impose any of the civil
disabilities ordinarily imposed by conviction .. .The disposition of
a child or any evidence given in the juvenile court shall not be admis-
sible as evidence against the child in any case or proceeding in any
other court ... "25 Also, "it is declared to be the intent of this chapter
that each child coming within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court
shall receive such care, guidance and control, preferably in his own
home, as will conduce to the child's welfare and the best interests of
the state; and when such child is removed from his own family, to
secure for him custody, care and discipline as nearly as possible equiva-
lent to that which should have been given by his parents."26
At this point a very important question presents itself: where does
the state get the power to do all of these things? The constitutionality
of juvenile court jurisdiction and procedure has been almost universally
upheld. The reason objections to this court's power have failed in
is Ibid., § 48.01 (5) (4b).
19 Ibid.,§ 48.07(1) (d).
20 Ibid., § 48.01(3).
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., § 48.07 (2).
2SIbid.,§ 48.01(2).
24Ibid., § 48.07 (1) (c).
25Ibid., § 48.07 (3).
2 Ibid., § 48.07(4).
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nearly every case is that they have assumed that the hearings were,
in nature, criminal proceedings requiring all of the constitutional and
statutory safeguards of a criminal trial; however, decisions upholding
the juvenile court acts have repeatedly pointed out that here is not a
criminal court, but an agent of the state fulfilling the state's duty to
step into the shoes of the parent when the latter has failed in his duty
of caring for the child; that so long as the disposition of cases is not
"punishment" but protection of the child, no lack of due process can
be raised. The first principle, then, is that it is the duty of the state,
as a political necessity, to pass such legislation for the care of those
of its citizens who are unable to take care of themselves. This has been
recognized in Wisconsin, in Milwaukee Industrial School v. Super-
visors of Milwaukee County27 and Lacher v. Venus,28u as an established
view not open to question. Secondly, the fact that the constitutional
guaranty that no person shall be deprived of "... . liberty ... without
due process of law"29 is not violated by such legislation was decided by
a federal court in 1911. 30 The Wisconsin court rendered a similar
decision in 1899,31 and the problem was more broadly considered in the
leading Pennsylvania decision of Commonwealth v. Fisher.32 The
court's opinion in the latter case pointed out that the constitutional pro-
visions at the basis of the objection applied to persons charged with
a 'criminal offense, but that the juvenile delinquency case in question
was not a trial for any crime; that the act was operative only where
there was to be no trial and that the purpose of the juvenile court act
was to prevent a trial. It added:
"To save a child from becoming a criminal, or from continuing
a career of crime, to end in maturer years in public punishment
and disgrace, the Legislature surely may provide for the salva-
tion of such a child, if its parent or guardian be unable or un-
willing to do so, by bringing it into one of the courts of the state
without any process at all, for the purpose of subjecting it to
the state's guardianship and protection. The natural parent
needs no process to temporarily deprive his child of its liberty
by confining it in its own home, to save it and to shield it from
the consequences of persistence in a career of waywardness;
nor is the state, when compelled as parens patriae to take the
place of the father for the same purpose, required to adopt any
process as a means of placing its hands upon the child to lead it
into one of its courts. When the child gets there, and the court,
with the power to save it, determines on its salvation, and not its
punishment, it is immaterial how it got there."
27 40 Wis. 428 (1776).
2 177 Wis. 558, 188 N.W. 613 (1922).
29 United States Constitution, Art. XIV, § 1.
30 Ex parte Januszewski, 196 Fed. 123 (E.D. Ohio 1911).31 Industrial School for Girls v. Clark County, 103 Wis. 651, 79 N.W. 422 (1899).
32 Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 Atl. 198 (1905).
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In answer to the allegation that there is a denial of the right to
trial by jury, the same decision again points out that such right is
present only in criminal proceedings, but that when a juvenile is
brought to the juvenile court, the court passes on nothing but the
propriety of an effort to save it. Whether the child deserves to be
saved by the state is no more a question for the jury than whether the
father, if able to save it, ought to save it. A similar view is expressed
by the Wisconsin court as follows:
"In proceedings in juvenile court . . . its (the state's) funda-
mental purpose is the conservation of the child as a member of
the state, and it extends alike to the child who is then not prop-
erly cared for by reason of the misfortune of its parents; is
abandoned or neglected by reason of their willful neglect to
perform their parental responsibilities; or, being itself delin-
quent, needs the supervision and control of the state ...The
exercise of this broad and generous function of the state has
been expressly declared to be based upon the quality of mercy
rather than upon the idea of punishment."3
A summary statement of the constitutionality of these proceedings
may be drawn from two additional Wisconsin decisions: the function
of the court is a legitimate exercise of the police power in the pro-
tection of the health, safety and general welfare of children.34
While the jurisdiction of the juvenile court is now well established,
some questions still may arise as to the application of rules of evidence
during hearings. A reasonable statement was offered by the New
York court in People v. Lewis :'-
"Since the proceeding was not a criminal one, there was neither
right to nor necessity for the procedural safeguards prescribed
by constitution and statute in criminal cases . .. (However)
there is no implication that a purely socialized trial of a specific
issue may properly or legally be had... The customary rules of
evidence shown by long experience as essential to getting at the
truth with reasonable certainty in civil trials must be adhered
to. The finding of fact must rest upon a preponderance of the
evidence adduced under those rules. Hearsay, opinion, gossip,
bias, prejudice, trends of hostile neighborhood feeling, the hopes
and fears of social workers, are all sources of error and have
no more place in Children's Courts than in any other court."
The reason underlying all of the foregoing holdings which uphold
the system of treatment as constitutional was stated by Julian Mack,
when he emphasized that the problem for the judge to determine in the
juvenile court is not, has this boy or girl committed a specific wrong
3 Lacher v. Venus, 177 Wis. 558, 188 N.W. 613 (1922); see also In re Alley,
174 Wis. 85, 182 N.W. 360 (1921).
34 In re Johnson, 173 Wis. 571, 171 N.W. 741 (1921); State v. Scholl, 167 Wis.
504, 167 N.W. 830. (1918).
5 People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353 (1932).
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defined in law, but how has be become what he is and what had best
be done in his interest and the interest of the state to save him from a
downward career.36 It may be noted here that the comparatively few
appealed juvenile court cases appearing in the reports is some indica-
tion that interested persons have found little legal dissatisfaction with
the proceedings. It is the writer's conclusion that where the spirit of
this legislation is adhered to by the personnel selected to administer
the law, there is more assurance of the spirit of the constitutional
guaranties being preserved than if statutory limitations are placed on
the proceedings. In this field particularly the workable plan is to direct
statutory qualifications to the matter of personnel selection rather than
to courtroom rules. Obviously, there is less opportunity, let alone mo-
tive, for a juvenile court and probation department of today to trample
on the inalienable legal rights of children than there was for the old
common law criminal courts to do so as they blindly followed the only
course permitted by law.
Do we have today the best possible juvenile delinquency laws?
Obviously not. In their book of a few years ago, the Gluecks asserted
that recidivism among juveniles was high.3 7 We learn that in the last
two years the nation's delinquency rate has been on the increase.3
Probation officers, judges and social workers tell us that the laws are
the result of patch-work legislation yet uncompleted. The American
Law Institute in 1940 proposed a Youth Court Act to apply to minors
who are otherwise not able to be brought within the juvenile court's
jurisdiction.3 9 This same body also proposed a new Youth Correction
Act.4 0 Perhaps the problem concerning the age at which a child
ceases to be a delinquent and becomes a criminal has reached the courts
more frequently than any other. Statutory ages vary in different states.
The following is what happened in Wisconsin: the legislature enacted
a law in which it defined as "delinquents" offenders under eighteen
years of age. Then to meet, by the method of compromise, the objec-
tions of those who argued that criminal courts should not be robbed
of their jurisdiction to so great an extent, the legislature provided
that criminal courts would have concurrent jurisdiction of those cases
where the accused was between sixteen and eighteen years of age;
to quote the statute, "in all cases of delinquent children over sixteen
years of age the criminal court shall have concurrent jurisdiction with
the juvenile court."' 41 The offender under consideration was called
3 6 Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L. REv. 104 (1909).
3 S. and E. T. GLUECK, 1000 JUVENILE DELINQUENTS (2d ed. 1934) ch. IX, 151-
152.
38M. G. Caldwell, Extent of Juvenile Delinquency in Wisconsin, 32 Jouii. op
Catm. LAW 148 (1941).
39 MICHAEL and WEcHSLLm, CRI mINAL LAW AND Irs ADMINISTRATION 958 (1940).
40 Ibid., p. 970.
43 Wis. STAT. (1941) § 48.01(5) (a)4.
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a "delinquent," not a criminal. The statute did not state whether or
not the criminal court, if it assumed jurisdiction, was to conduct a
criminal trial of the "delinquent." This question has not been made an
issue in any appeal, although, in conformity with the Wisconsin
Attorney General's opinion,42 where the criminal court does take juris-
diction of a minor between sixteen and eighteen years of age the trial
becomes a criminal one and the sentence, if any, is the same as that
had in adult criminal cases. Thus, for example, where a Wisconsin
probation department which has been given the custody of a fourteen
year old boy who has been habitually truant from school sees fit to
discharge him within a year or so, and then shortly thereafter, at the
age of seventeen, the same boy is arrested for stealing an automobile,
he may be convicted for larceny and sentenced by the criminal court.
The net effect of this type of legislation, therefore, is to insure the bene-
fits of non-criminality to children sixteen years and under, and maybe
to those between sixteen and eighteen.
To meet this kind of problem, there was established in Brooklyn,
New York, in 1935, an Adolescent Court for minors above the statu-
tory juvenile delinquency age to do for these offenders what the earlier
legislation has done for the younger group.43 This is based on the
theory that such immaturity which might justify treatment rather than
punishment of young offenders can also be found among sixteen to
twenty-one year old persons.
Not all jurisdictions have had absolute faith in the efficacy of
making the young offender immune from the penalties of the criminal
law. A fifteen year old girl was sentenced by an Illinois court to a
twenty-five year term in the women's reformatory for homicide. The
criminal court had concurrent jurisdiction with the juvenile court,
the latter having previously had custody of the girl on unrelated
charges. In holding, on appeal, that the criminal court had properly
assumed jurisdiction, the opinion declared, "It was not intended by
the legislature that the juvenile court should be made a haven of
refuge for a delinquent child of the age recognized by law as capable
of committing a crime, or that he should be immune from punish-
ment for violation of the criminal laws of the state committed by
such child subsequent to his being declared a delinquent." 44
The general tendency of the courts is to analyze the seriousness of
the offense to determine which of the two courts should handle a
case; hence, in most jurisdictions a child committing an act which
amounts to a felony usually is subjected to criminal proceedings. The
Connecticut court reversed a criminal conviction of a fifteen year old
4220 OPiNioNs oF ATTY. GEN. 1978 (1931).43Supra, note 39, p. 967.
44 People v. Lattimore, 362 Ill. 206, 199 N.E. 275 (1935).
19421
THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
boy for the crime of rape,45 but said in its opinion, "It is difficult to
attribute to the Legislature an intent that every offender under the age
of sixteen, though he may have committed murder, rape, robbery or
other serious crime, and however hardened he may be by iniquity,
merely because he has not reached that age, though it be but a matter
of days, must necessarily be immune from criminal proceedings .. .
The defendant not only committed a heinous offense, at a time when
he fell short of the age of sixteen by but a few weeks, but the long
series of serious crimes with which he is charged at least suggests that
he is thoroughly depraved and irresponsible. The thought of remitting
the disposition of proceedings against such an offender to the juvenile
court arouses a natural reluctance. That such a course would not accord
with the the general feeling of mankind is indicated by the fact that
in most juvenile court acts... some provision is made for the disposi-
tion of such cases ... Moreover, to draw an arbitrary line of distinc-
tion at the age of sixteen, without regard to the character or history
of the offender or the circumstances of the offense, is hardly cognizant
with that individualization of punishment which has become one of
the fundamentals of modern penology." In an early New Jersey com-
mon law holding it was said, "The distinctions . .. as to age when
crimes may be committed and the criminal punished are, in no con-
siderable degree, arbitrary ... The real value of the distinctions is to
fix the party upon whom the proof of this capacity lies."'46 It appears
that in the Connecticut case 47 the court argued, as at common law, that
wherever capacity is shown-a consciousness of guilt-punishment
should follow. But in fact the "fundamentals of modern penology"
carry to its limits the present theory that capacity or not, guilty or not,
the action of the state should not be punishment, but any suitable plan
for rehabilitation of the individual. Nor does the theory overlook the
fact that there are many young, teen-age law violaters in the United
States who seem to be beyond the ability of a juvenile probation
department's aid and who would seem to deserve confinement away
from society. When such an offender is brought before the court,
jurisdiction of the criminal court-or the decision to punish the
offender-is generally, in practice, determined by the necessity of
confinement for society's protection or as an example to others.
Neither of these reasons, where they predominate, are based on a
penalty to the offender for his crime. The legal tests applied are those
used at common law by the criminal court, e.g., does the individual
show a heart void of social duty and fatally bent on mischief ?48 Did
-5 State v. Elbert, 115 Conn. 589, 162 At. 769 (1932).
46 State v. Aaron, 4 N.J.L. 232 (1818).
47 Supra, note 45.
" State v. Vineyard, 81 W.Va. 98, 93 S.E. 1034 (1917).
[Vol. 26
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY LEGISLATION
the offender know that he was acting wrongfully in the eyes of the
law ?"
Examples of the more technical problems confronting the adminis-
trators of these laws include the case where a twenty-two year old
was charged with first degree murder and proof on trial indicated that
his mental age was possibly that of a thirteen year old. It was held
that this could not make him subject to the juvenile law, physical age
being the determining factor.50 In Rhode Island it has been held that
where a juvenile delinquent under sixteen years of age commits an
offense, but proceedings are first begun against him when he is over
sixteen years of age, the latter time determines which court shall hear
the case and not the time of the offense.51
The more far-reaching social effects of this legislation, its degree
of success and failure, is beyond the scope of this note, but is clearly
presented in "1000 Juvenile Delinquents.152 This book contains a
thorough review of the laws of the United States on the subject.
Current information is obtainable at the Children's Bureau, Depart-
ment of Labor, Washington, D. C. For the purposes of this present
paper, that is, the high-lighting of certain legal problems of these laws,
a concluding summary cannot be accurately made without reference
to the social demands which crystallize the problems, just as it was
social policy which motivated the entire modern approach to juvenile
legislation. Since, then, it is the problem of the juvenile court to deter-
mine whether a program of correction and guidance should be fol-
lowed for a particular individual, someone has to conduct that pro-
gram. That is the duty of the probation department without which the
entire system would fail. Probation means release, not imprisonment;
protection, not prosecution; correction, not just punishment; guidance,
not frustration; the making of a citizen, not a criminal. Yet, if this
be the keynote of present legislation, what about the fact that seven-
teen year old boy can be sentenced to imprisonment in Wisconsin,
and in many other states, for the remainder of his natural life? On the
one hand it may be argued that, even if the boy is not a hardened
criminal, society must know, other boys must realize that crime does
not pay. This argument is the same as that used by the English court
in 1748 when it sentenced a ten year old boy to be hanged on the
theory that "it would be of dangerous consequence to have it thought
that children may commit such crimes with impunity."5 3 So a convic-
tion is upheld as a proper punishment, setting an example for others
49 31 CoRPus JuRIs 1095, J 213.
50 Commonwealth v. Trippi, 268 Mass. 227, 167 N.E. 354 (1929).
51 Ex parte Albiniano, 62 R.I. 429, 6 At. (2d) 554 (1939).52 Supra, note 39.53 Rex v. York, Foster's Crown Law 70 (Eng. 1748) ; (Noted, Bennet & Heard,
Leading Cases (1856) 68).
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to deter them from the same path of crime. On the other hand, it may
be asserted that if the state releases this offender and he admits his
wrongdoing, he may never make his mistake again; therefore give
him the opportunity to make his life worthwhile if he repents.
It is the task of future legislators to decide which case implicit in
these two views is the stronger-possibly not only as to young persons,
but to every human being who falls into the hands of those upon whom
rests the duty to administer justice.
